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Jocelyn Downie* Foreseeably Unclear: The Meaning of the
Kate Scallion** "Reasonably Foreseeable" Criterion for
Access to Medical Assistance in Dying
in Canada
Canada's medical assistance in dying legislation contains the eligibility criterion
"natural death has become reasonably foreseeable." The phrase "reasonably
foreseeable" is unfamiliar and unclear. As a result of ongoing confusion about
its meaning, there is reason to be concerned that under- or over-inclusive
interpretations of the phrase are adversely affecting access to MAID. With
critical interests at stake (eg access to MAiD and potential criminal liability), it is
essential that the meaning of the phrase be clarified. Furthermore, the meaning of
"reasonably foreseeable" will be at issue in the Charter challenges to the federal
MAiD legislation currently before the courts in British Columbia and Quebec. In
order to determine whether the s. 241.2(2) violates the Charter, the courts will first
have to determine what "reasonably foreseeable" means because whether the
limits on access to MAiD violate the Charter depends on the scope of the limits.
This paper therefore brings the principles of statutory interpretation to bear and
proposes an interpretation of "reasonably foreseeable" in an effort to contribute
to the judicial consideration of the meaning of the phrase and to guide clinical
practice until clarification is provided by the courts.
La legislation canadienne en matiere d'aide medicale a mourir (AMM) prevoit le
critere d'admissibilite selon lequel la mort naturelle est devenue raisonnablement
previsible .,, L'expression raisonnablement previsible , est pas familiere et
nest pas claire. En raison de la confusion persistante quant a sa signification, il
y a lieu de s'inquieter du fait que des interpretations trop larges ou trop etroites
de Iexpression nuisent a Iacces a IAMM. Compte tenu des inter~ts critiques en
jeu (par exemple Iacces a IAMM et la responsabilite penale potentielle), il est
essentiel que le sens de Iexpression soit clarifie. De plus, le sens de IVexpression
raisonnablement previsible , sera en cause dans les contestations au titre de
la Charte de la legislation federale sur IAMM actuellement devant les tribunaux
en Colombie-Britannique et au Quebec. Pour determiner si le par. 241.2(2) viole
la Charte, les tribunaux devront d'abord determiner ce que Ion entend par
raisonnablement previsible ,, car la question de savoir si les restrictions a
Iacces a IAMM violent la Charte depend de I'etendue de ces restrictions. Le
present document met donc a profit les principes de IPinterpretation des lois et
propose une interpretation de Iexpression raisonnablement previsible > afin de
contribuer a Iexamen judiciaire du sens de Iexpression et de guider la pratique
clinique jusqua ce que les tribunaux apportent des precisions.
* Jocelyn Downie, CM, FRSC, FCAHS, SJD, holds the James S. Palmer Chair in Public Policy
and Law at the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Canada.
** LLM candidate at the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University.
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A very practical coda
Introduction
In April 2016, the federal government of Canada introduced draft
legislation to regulate medical assistance in dying (MAID). 1 There was a
swift and fierce response to various aspects of the Bill with some of the
fiercest criticisms aimed at one of the criteria for eligibility found in the
proposed text for s. 241.2(2) of the Criminal Code:
(2) A person has a grievous and irremediable medical condition only if
they meet all of the following criteria:
(d) their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking
1. Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts
(medical assistance in dying), 1st Sess, 42nd Pan, 2016 (passed as SC 2016, c 3) [Bill C-14].
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into account all of their medical circumstances, without a prognosis
necessarily having been made as to the specific length of time that they
have remaining.2
Some criticized the provision for being inconsistent with the Canadian
Charter ofRights and Freedoms3 (drawing especially, but not exclusively,
on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Carter v. Canada4).
This criticism is now being litigated in the courts through Lamb v. Attorney
General and Jean Truchon and Nicole Gladu v. Attorney General (Canada)
and Attorney General (Quebec)5 and is not the focus of this paper.
Others criticized the provision for containing a phrase that is unfamiliar
and unclear: "reasonably foreseeable."6
Despite attempts to remove s. 241.2(2) (at the hearings for both the
House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights
and the Standing Senate Committee of Legal and Constitutional Affairs,
and in amendments passed by the Senate' but rejected by the House of
Commons'), the provision remained in the version of the legislation that
came into force on 17 June 2016.'
Not surprisingly, twenty-four months on, there is confusion among
health care providers, lawyers, and the public as to what the provision
means. One court case tackled the issue head on but, for reasons discussed
below, did not resolve all ofthe confusion.l" One College of Physicians and
Surgeons recently revised its MAiD standard to include an interpretation
2. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 241.2(2).
3. See, e.g., Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Evidence, 42nd Part,
1st Sess, No 10 (6 June 2016) (Peter Hogg); House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and
Human Rights, Evidence, 42nd Part, 1st Sess, No 13 (4 May 2016) at 2045 (Jocelyn Downie).
4. Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter].
5. Lamb v Canada (Attorney General), Vancouver, SCBC, S-165851 (notice of civil claim filed
27 June 2016), online: <bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2016-06-27-Notice-of-Civil-Claim-1.
pdf> [Lamb]; Jean Truchon and Nicole Gladu v Attorney General (Canada) and Attorney General
(Quebec), Montreal, CQ (Civ Div) (notice of Application to Proceed for Declaratory Relief filed
13 June 2017), online: <www.menardmartinavocats.com/documents/file/demande-introductive-
da%C2%80%C2%99instance-en-jugement-dC3 %83 %C2%89claratoire.pdf> [Truchon and
Gladu].
6. Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Evidence, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess,
No 9 (10 May 2016) (Dr. Douglas Grant, Dr. Joel Kirsh); House of Commons, Standing Committee
on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 13 (4 May 2016) at 1720 (Dr. Jeff
Blackmer).
7. "Bill C-14," 3rd reading, Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 150, No 50 (15 June
2016) at 1900ff; Senate, Journals ofthe Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 74 (16 June 2016).
8. House of Commons, Order Paper, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 74 (16 June 2016).
9. Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 150, No 52 (17 June 2016) at 1520, 1700 (George
Furey).
10. AB v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONSC 3759, 139 OR (3d) 139 [AB].
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of the reasonably foreseeable criterion.11 Unfortunately, others have not
(yet) followed suit. As a result of the ongoing confusion, there is reason to
be concerned that under- or over-inclusive interpretations of this eligibility
criterion are adversely affecting access to MAID.12 With critical interests at
stake (e.g., access to MAiD and potential criminal liability), it is essential
that the meaning of the provision be clarified. 3
Furthermore, the meaning of "reasonably foreseeable" will no doubt
be contested in the two Charter challenges to the federal MAiD legislation
currently before the courts in British Columbia and Quebec.4 In order to
determine whether s. 241.2(2) violates the Charter, the courts will have
to first determine what it means because whether the limits on access to
MAiD violate the Charter depends on the scope of the limits.
For these two reasons, and because MAiD providers and assessors and
the public need guidance as they wait for an authoritative interpretation
from the courts, it is worth bringing the principles of statutory interpretation
to bear on the phrase "reasonably foreseeable."5
Introduction
I. Case law
As of 1 June 2018, there has been one court case interpreting the
phrase "reasonably foreseeable" within s. 241.2(2)(d). In AB v. Attorney
11. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Nova Scotia, Professional Standard Regarding Medical
Assistance in Dying (Halifax: CPSNS, 2018) at 5, online: <cpsns.ns.ca/guideline/medical-assistance-
in-dying/> [Professional Standard].
12. Between 1 January and 30 June 2017, of the 832 reported cases of requests for MAiD, 73-80
were declined and the most frequently cited reasons for declining requests for MAiD were: "Loss
of competency, Death not reasonably foreseeable, Other." Health Canada, The 2nd Interim Report
on Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada (Ottawa: October 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/
health-canada/services/publications/health-sy stem-services/medical-assistance-dying-interim-report-
sep-2017.html>. Of course we do not know from these numbers whether this reflects under-inclusion.
13. See Meaghan Craig, "Medically Assisted Death Fails Saskatoon Family," Global News (29 May
2018), online: <globalnews.ca/news/4236902/medically-assisted-death-fails-saskatoon-family/>;
Keith Gerein, "'An Iron Will': For Some, Alberta's Medical Aid in Dying Process is Still a Work
in Progress," Edmonton Journal (5 February 2018), online: <edmontonjournal.com/news/local-
news/an-iron-will-for-some-albertas-medical-aid-in-dying-process-is-still-a-work-in-progress>;
Kas Roussy, "Parkinson's Patient Forced to Battle Bureaucracy around Assisted Death," CBC News
(14 December 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/health/parkinson-s-assisted-death-canada-doctors-
maid-1.4416392>. See also "B.C. woman who challenged right-to-die laws gets medically assisted
death," Canadian Press (18 September 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia
assisted-dying-law-canada-moro- 1.4294809>.
14. Lamb, supra note 5; Truchon and Gladu, supra note 5.
15. It may, in the future, be possible to bring even more contextual factors to bear. For example, one
might consider patients' perspectives on the meaning of "reasonably foreseeable." However, we have
not engaged in this interpretive exercise here because there is not yet sufficient evidence to draw upon.
We focus on legal and clinical contexts because those are the domains about which we have sufficient
information.
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General (Canada), one physician assessed AB and found that she met
the reasonably foreseeable criterion. A second physician assessed her and
found that she did not. A third assessed her and found that she did. That
should have been sufficient. However, despite being of the belief that
she met the eligibility criteria, neither the first nor third physician then
felt comfortable proceeding given the disagreement and so neither was
willing to provide MAID. At that point, the case was taken to court. In his
decision, Justice Perell of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice drew the
following conclusions with respect to the meaning of s. 241.2(2)(d):
[N]atural death need not be imminent and that what is a reasonably
foreseeable death is a person-specific medical question to be made
without necessarily making, but not necessarily precluding, a prognosis
of the remaining lifespan.'6
[I]n formulating an opinion, the physician need not opine about the
specific length of time that the person requesting medical assistance in
dying has remaining in his or her lifetime.'
The language reveals that the natural death need not be connected to a
particular terminal disease or condition and rather is connected to all of
a particular person's medical circumstances.'8
[T]he language does not require that people be dying from a tenninal
illness, disease or disability.'9
[T]he language of s. 241.2(2)(d) encompasses, on a case-by-case basis,
a person who is on a trajectory toward death because he or she: (a) has a
serious and incurable illness, disease or disability; (b) is in an advanced
state of in-eversible decline in capability; (c) is enduring physical or
psychological suffering that is intolerable and that cannot be relieved
under conditions that they consider acceptable."z
Key to Justice Perell's statutory interpretation is the rejection of any
requirement of temporal proximity of death, the embrace of the need for
the assessment of reasonable foreseeability to be "person-specific" and
to take into account "all of a particular person's medical circumstances,"
and the limiting of "reasonably foreseeable" to a "trajectory toward death
because he or she: [meets s. 241.2(2)(a)-(c)]." (emphasis added).
However, this case, while revealing, is not determinative. Indeed,
despite Justice Perell explicitly finding that "AB's natural death is
16. AB, supra note 10 at para 79.
17. Ibid at para 80.
18. Ibidat para 81.
19. Ibid at para 82.
20. Ibid at para 83.
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reasonably foreseeable,"21 the original physician was still not willing to
provide MAiD and so a fourth physician had to be found.2 More generally,
the case's impact is limited to Ontario and it is not a binding precedent even
in Ontario as it is a decision from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.
In addition, neither the Attorney General (Ontario) nor the Attorney
General (Canada) took a position in the case on the issue of the meaning of
s. 241.2(2)(d). Finally, even though it decided not to appeal the decision,
the Crown did not concede that the decision's statutory interpretation is
correct. Therefore, we must proceed with a full statutory interpretation.
II. Ordinary meaning
According to the Canadian Oxford Dictionary, "reasonably" is the
adverbial form of "reasonable." "Reasonable" is defined as:
1. having sound judgement; moderate; ready to listen to reason. 2. In
accordance with reason; not absurd. 3a. within the limits of reason; fair,
moderate (a reasonable request) b. inexpensive; not extortionate. c. fairly
good, average.
23
"Foreseeable" is the adjective form of "foresee," which the Canadian
Oxford Dictionary defines as "see or be aware of before hand.
2 4
The ordinary meaning of "reasonably foreseeable," applied to the
MAiD context, is that it is in accordance with reason/not absurd to be
aware beforehand that someone will die a natural death. Clearly, it is not
reasonable to interpret the legislation as meaning "that it is in accordance
with reason/not absurd that health care providers are aware that someone
will die a natural death"-natural death is over 90 percent certain for all of
us from the moment of our birth as fewer than 10 percent of deaths are a
result of suicide, homicide, or accident.5 Therefore, the ordinary meaning
of this phrase, read alone or in isolation, cannot provide a definition for
this provision in the Act because doing so would violate the absurdity
principle of statutory interpretation26 and the rule against "mere surplusage"
(meaninglessness) .27 We must therefore look beyond the ordinary meaning
for additional interpretive direction.
21. Ibidatpara6.
22. Email from Shanaaz Gookol to Jocelyn Downie (29 May 2018), personal correspondence with
the author.
23. Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2nd ed, sub verbo "reasonable."
24. Ibid, sub verbo "foreseeable."
25. Statistics Canada, "Mortality: Overview, 2010 and 2011," by Laurent Martel, inReport on the
Demographic Situation in Canada, Catalogue No 91-209-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 30 November
2015).
26. Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1995] 2 SCR 1031.
27. See Medovarski v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 227 at para
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III. Technical (clinical) meaning
When testifying about Bill C-14 before the Senate, the Minister of Health
indicated that the use of the phrase "reasonably foreseeable" had support
from the Canadian Medical Association (CMA): "This language has not
been something which has presented a challenge to the group that studied
doctors' opinions on this to the largest extent of any organization in this
country."28
However, the Canadian Medical Association had not conducted any
valid research regarding doctors' opinions on "reasonably foreseeable."29
Furthermore, Jeff Blackmer, the CMA's Vice President, Medical
Professionalism, acknowledged the lack of consistent support for the
phrase among physicians when he testified before the House of Commons
Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights:
What the wording in Bill C-14 does is it allows us to understand how
grievous this condition has to be. So we would say while it may not
be perfect from a physician standpoint-and I've heard colleagues who
have said it provides clear guidance, and I've heard colleagues who say
I'm not quite sure how to interpret that-it's certainly much improved.
If the committee felt there was additional language that could be added
to further improve that, to further clarify that for physicians, we would
welcome that.0
He also testified that: "given the type of association we are, it's very
difficult for Dr. Forbes [then President of the CMA] and me to pretend
to represent 80,000 members when we haven't had that discussion
internally."31 Not surprisingly, the CMA has subsequently indicated that
"reasonably foreseeable" is posing difficulties for providers.32
41, [2003] 4 FCR 227: "Lastly, Parliament intended that its words have some meaning. Words of a
statute are not to be ignored. Thus, a legislative provision should not be interpreted so as to render
it 'mere surplusage"' (R v Proulx, [2001] 1 SCR 61, at paragraph 28), meaningless, pointless or
redundant (Winters v Legal Services Society, 1999 CanLII 656 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 160; Morguard
Properties Ltd et al v City of Winnipeg, 1983 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1983] 2 SCR 493)."
28. Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 150, Issue 41 (1 June 2016) at 1740 (Jane
Philpott).
29. The CMA did issue a press release right at the peak of debate about Bill C-14 with "results" of
a survey of physicians. However, the closing date for the survey had not yet passed, and only 2,500
physicians had responded (which is approximately 3 percent of the CMA's member physicians). Sucha
response rate renders the results totally invalid. Furthermore, the survey did not ask about "reasonably
foreseeable." See Canadian Medical Association, News Release, "Nine in 10 doctors agree federal
legislation needed on Medical Assistance in Dying" (16 June 2016), online: CMA <www.cma.ca!En/
Pages/nine-in-10-doctors-agree-fedeml-legislation-needed-on-medical-assistance-in-dying.aspx>.
30. House of Commons, Evidence (4 May 2016), supra note 6 at 1720 (Dr. Jeff Blackmer).
31. Ibid.
32. See Shannon Proudfoot, "Why Canada's Assisted-Dying Law is Confusing Doctors-and
Patients," Maclean (18 November 2016), online: <www.macleans.ca/news/canada/why-canadas-
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Further evidence in support of the claim that "reasonably foreseeable"
does not have an established technical (clinical) meaning is the fact that
when Bill C-14 was being considered by Parliament, the president of
the Federation of Medical Regulatory Authorities of Canada (FMRAC)
testified to the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs
that "reasonably foreseeable" "is legal, not medical, language."33 Similarly,
Monica Branigan, chair of the Canadian Society of Palliative Care
Physicians, testified that, "[a]mong my colleagues, not only my palliative
care colleagues, 'reasonably foreseeable' does not have a medical meaning
because it is reasonably foreseeable that we will all die. 34 Catherine
Ferrier, President of the Physicians' Alliance Against Euthanasia, said
"[t]he requirement that natural death be reasonably foreseeable means
nothing to us as physicians."35
Soon after the passage of the legislation, the press quoted Fleur-
Ange Lefebvre, executive director and CEO of FMRAC, as saying that
the vagueness of the term "reasonably foreseeable death" is a "significant
concern," and that "[t]he federation does not know how to define the
term."36 Similarly, Senator Joyal stated in the Senate debates on C-14 that
"' [r]easonably foreseeable' is a Criminal Code concept. It is not a medical
concept."37
One year after the passage of the legislation, the Canadian Association
of MAiD Assessors and Providers (CAMAP) released a clinical practice
guideline (CPG), but even it noted that "[t]he term 'reasonably foreseeable'
is not one used in clinical medical practice. It is a legal term used mainly
in civil law (although also found in the criminal law), and there it relates
to risk, harm and the law of negligence."38
Almost two years after the passage the legislation, the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Nova Scotia amended their MAiD standard to
include the following:
assisted-dying-law-is-confusing-doctors-and-patients/>. In this article, Dr. JeffBlackmer says, "There
is very clearly uncertainty in the medical community-there's no question."
33. Senate, Evidence (10 May 2016), supra note 6 (Dr. Douglas Grant).
34. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 42nd Part,
1st Sess, No 11 (3 May 2016) at 1027 (Dr. Monica Branigan). Note, the transcript reads: "not only
palliative my colleagues"; we assume this was a transcription error and for ease of reading have edited
the quote rather than quoting the transcript and using [sic].
35. House of Commons, Evidence (4 May 2016), supra note 3 at 1700 (Dr. Catherine Ferrier).
36. Barbara Sibbald, "Doctors Left to Define Foreseeable Death in New Law" (27 June 2016)
188:11 CMAJ, E243, online: <www.cmaj.ca/content/188/11/E243.full>.
37. Debates of the Senate, 42nd Part, 1st Sess, Vol 150, Issue 42 (2 June 2016) at 1700 (Serge Joyal).
38. CAMAP, "The Clinical Interpretation of 'Reasonably Foreseeable"' in Clinical Practice
Guideline (2017) at 3, online: <www.camapcanada.ca/cpgl.pdf> ["Clinical Interpretation"].
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The only court decision to date addressing "reasonably foreseeable"
states that:
natural death need not be imminent and that what is a reasonably
foreseeable death is a person-specific medical question to be made
without necessarily making, but not necessarily precluding, a
prognosis of the remaining lifespan.
In formulating an opinion, the physician need not opine about the
specific length of time that the person requesting medical assistance
in dying has remaining in his or her lifetime. (AB v. Canada 2017
ONSC 3759, pam 79-80)
Therefore, natural death will be reasonably foreseeable if a medical or
nurse practitioner is of the opinion that a patient's natural death will be
sufficiently soon or that the patient's cause of natural death has become
predictable.
39
No others have provided their members with interpretive guidance.
It can therefore be concluded that "reasonably foreseeable" did not (and
still does not40) have an established technical (clinical) meaning derived
from specialized use by physicians or nurse practitioners in a clinical
context (of course, with the implementation of the MAiD legislation, a
technical (clinical) meaning may develop in time). We must therefore next
look to see whether there is an established legal meaning of the phrase.
IV. Legal meaning
"Reasonably foreseeable" is a term found elsewhere in law. Indeed,
the Minister of Justice explicitly stated in the House that, "[r]easonable
foreseeability is something that has been used quite regularly in the
Criminal Code."41  The official Legislative Background: Medical
Assistance in Dying (Bill C-14) that accompanied the introduction of Bill
C-14 described "reasonably foreseeable" as "a more familiar legal concept
[than 'end of life'].
42
39. CPSNS, Professional Standard, supra note 11 at 5.
40. CAMAP, "Clinical Interpretation," supra note 38 at 1-2. The CAMAP guideline suggests
interpreting "reasonably foreseeable" as meaning: "'reasonably predictable' from the patient's
combination of known medical conditions and potential sequelae, whilst taking other factors including
age and frailty into account." However, the guideline is not without controversy (see, e.g. Dr. Jeff
Blackmer's comments in Kelly Grant, "Group of Assisted-Death Providers Publish Clinical-Practice
Guideline", Globe andMail (2 June 2017), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/group-
of-assisted-death-providers-publish-clinical-practice-guideline/article35192103/>. The CAMAP's
CPG also has an element of inconsistency with some of the reasoning in what follows in this paper,
particularly with respect to "end of life," which, we will argue below, is inconsistent with legislative
intent and should not be read into the definition of "reasonably foreseeable."
41. House of Commons Debates, 42nd Part, 1st Sess, No 74 (16 June 2016) at 1103 (Jody Wilson-
Raybould).
42. Department of Justice, Legislative Background: Medical Assistance in Dying (Bill C-14, as
Assented to on June 17, 2016) (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2016) at 20, online: <www.justice.
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The legal meaning of the phrase is important because the Supreme
Court of Canada has been very clear in its position that the court should
assume that Parliament intends the legal meaning of legal terms:
When Parliament uses a term with a legal meaning, it intends the term to
be given that meaning. Words that have a well-understood legal meaning
when used in a statute should be given that meaning unless Parliament
clearly indicates otherwise. This principle has been applied in a number
of cases such as Will-Kare Paving & Contracting Ltd v Canada, 2000
SCC 36, [2000] 1 SCR 915, at paras 29-30; Townsend v Kroppmanns,
2004 SCC 10, [2004] 1 SCR 315, at para 9; AYSA Amateur Youth
Soccer Association v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2007 SCC 42, [2007]
3 SCR 217, at paras 8-23 and 48- 49. Most recently in R v Summers,
2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 SCR 575, the Court noted that "Parliament is
presumed to know the legal context in which it legislates" and that it
is "inconceivable" that Parliament would intend to disturb well-settled
law without "explicit language" or by "relying on inferences that could
possibly be drawn from the order of certain provisions in the Criminal
Code": paras 55-56.1
3
1. Criminal law context
As noted above, the Minister of Justice stated in the House that,
"[r]easonable foreseeability is something that has been used quite
regularly in the Criminal Code.144 However, apart from in the MAiD
provision, "reasonably foreseeable" and its linguistic cognates actually
appear only once in the Criminal Code of Canada-in s. 753(1)(a)(ii)
respecting the test for whether someone shall be found to be a dangerous
offender ("reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of his or
her behaviour"45). This phrase has not been judicially considered in the
context of s. 753(1)(a)(ii).
gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/adm-amsr/index.html> [Legislative Background].
43. RvDLW, 2016 SCC22 atpar 20, [2016] 1 SCR 402.
44. House of Commons Debates (16 June 2016), supra note 41 at 1103 (Jody Wilson-Raybould).
45. Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 753(1): On application made under this Part after an assessment
report is filed under subsection 752.1(2), the court shall find the offender to be a dangerous offender if
it is satisfied
(a) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence
described in paragraph (a) of the definition of that expression in section 752 and the offender
constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons on the
basis of evidence establishing
I[...]I
(ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which
he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a substantial degree of indifference on the
part of the offender respecting the reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of his
or her behavior [...]
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Moving to the broader criminal law context (i.e., not limited to the
text of the Criminal Code), the Supreme Court of Canada considered the
meaning of "reasonably foreseeable" in R v. Nur.46 The Supreme Court
discussed the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences and
whether or not it is reasonably foreseeable that mandatory minimum
sentences would impose grossly disproportionate sentences. The Supreme
Court said that in reviewing mandatory minimum sentences, "the court
may look not only at the offender's situation, but at other reasonably
foreseeable situations where the impugned law may apply."4 Further, the
Supreme Court asserted:
Not only is looking at the law's impact on persons whom it is reasonably
foreseeable the law may catch workable-it is essential to effective
constitutional review. Refusing to consider reasonably foreseeable
impacts of an impugned law would dramatically curtail the reach of the
Charter and the ability of the courts to discharge their duty to scrutinize
the constitutionality of legislation and maintain the integrity of the
constitutional order.48
Later, the Supreme Court gave more details about the reasonable
foreseeability test, saying the test:
is not confined to situations that are likely to arise in the general day-
to-day application of the law. Rather, it asks what situations may
reasonably arise. It targets circumstances that are foreseeably captured
by the minimum conduct caught by the offence. Only situations that are
'remote' or 'far-fetched' are excluded.49
The Supreme Court did not draw the defining line for reasonable
foreseeability at likelihood, explicitly drawing it instead at remoteness
(understood as "far-fetched").
R v. Maybin" is another leading criminal case that discussed the phrase
reasonably foreseeable," here with respect to intervening acts (i.e., was
the intervening act and its resultant harm reasonably foreseeable). The
Supreme Court stated:
[I]t is the general nature of the intervening acts and the accompanying
risk of hann that needs to be reasonably foreseeable. Legal causation
does not require that the accused must objectively foresee the precise
future consequences of their conduct. Nor does it assist in addressing
46. R v Nur, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 SCR 773.
47. Ibid at para 58.
48. Ibid at para 63.
49. Ibid at para 68.
50. R vMaybin, 2012 SCC 24, [2012] 2 SCR 30.
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moral culpability to require merely that the risk of some non-trivial
bodily hann is reasonably foreseeable. Rather, the intervening acts and
the ensuing non-trivial harm must be reasonably foreseeable in the sense
that the acts and the harm that actually transpired flowed reasonably
from the conduct of the appellants.5
This is, of course, not terribly helpful as it is about causation rather than
prediction.
Because it will become relevant in the later discussion of legislative
intent, it must be noted here that one cannot draw any temporal proximity
limit for "reasonably foreseeable" in C-14 from the criminal law context;
it says nothing explicitly and does not invite inferences about temporal
proximity.
From these cases, the most that can be drawn regarding the meaning
of "reasonably foreseeable" for s. 241.2(2)(d) is "prediction of natural
death is 'not far-fetched."' Given the 90 percent likelihood of a natural
death for every one of us, this interpretation of "reasonably foreseeable"
alone and only of this phrase in isolation, again, falls afoul of the rules
against absurdity and mere surplusage. We must look beyond the criminal
law context for additional interpretive direction to perform the necessary
narrowing function.
2. Civil law context
The Alberta Court of Appeal provided a succinct definition of "reasonably
foreseeable" in the context of negligence: "an event will be found
reasonably foreseeable as a 'real risk' when it is 'one which would occur
to the mind of a reasonable man in the position of the defendant [...] and
which he could not brush aside as far-fetched.'
52
Because it will become relevant in the later discussion of legislative
intent, it must be noted here that, inasmuch as the concept of proximity
plays a part in the legal meaning of "reasonably foreseeable" in the civil
context, it is only in relation to the determination of whether there is a duty
of care between the plaintiff and the defendant,53 which is not relevant to
51. Ibidatpara 38.
52. Phillip v Bablitz, 2011 ABCA 383 at para 29, 59 Alta LR (5th) 152. Reasonable foreseeability
is also discussed in Beecham v Hughes (1988), 52 DLR (4th) 625 at para 60, where the B.C. Court
of Appeal quotes McLoughlin v Obrien, [1983] 1 AC 410 at 432-433: "Foreseeability, in any given
set of circumstances, is ultimately a question of fact." See also Donoghue v Stevenson, [1932] All ER
Rep 1 (HL); Hall v Hebert, [1993] 2 SCR 159; Cooper v Hobart, 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 SCR 357;
Mustapha v Culligan of Canada Ltd (2006), 84 OR (3d) 457 (CA); Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, 2003
SCC 69, [2003] SCR 263.
53. See, e.g., Hall v Hebert, [1993] 2 SCR 159 at para 114: "The notion of legal proximity has
been traditionally formulated in terms of whether the risk of harm ought to have been reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant" and para 115: "This Court has approved the two stage test for considering
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the interpretation of C-14. One cannot draw any temporal proximity limit
for "reasonably foreseeable" in C-14 from the civil context as C-14 has
nothing to do with a duty of care between individuals.
Therefore, the most that can be drawn regarding the meaning of
"reasonably foreseeable" for s. 241.2(2)(d) is again "prediction of
natural death is 'not far-fetched."' Reliance on the civil legal meaning of
"reasonably foreseeable" alone and only of this phrase in isolation would
lead to a violation of the rules against absurdity and mere surplusage. Once
more, we must look beyond the civil context for additional interpretive
direction.
V. The Act itself
1. Section 241.2(2)(d)
The phrase "reasonably foreseeable" must be read in the context of the
specific provision,5 4 the section,55 and the entirety of the Act56 within
which it is found.
The specific provision ofthe Act within which "reasonably foreseeable"
appears also includes the phrases "has become" and "taking into account
all of their medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having
been made as to the specific length of time that they have remaining."
"Has become" narrows the ordinary and legal meaning of "reasonably
foreseeable."7 In other words, it implies that our deaths are not already
reasonably foreseeable from birth (even though, for all of us, there is a 90
percent chance of dying a natural death). For X to be able to become Y, it
cannot have already beenY. Something must change sometime after birth to
foreseeability, proximity and duty of care. It is: (i) is there a sufficiently close relationship between the
parties so that, in the reasonable contemplation of a party, carelessness on its part might cause damage
to another person; if so, (ii) are there any considerations which should negate or limit (a) the scope
of the duty and (b) the class of persons to whom it is owed or (c) the damages to which a breach of it
may give rise."
54. Using the maxim of statutory interpretation noscitur a sociis ("know a thing by its associates").
55. See, e.g., House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 148, No 45 (22 April 2016) at
1028 (Jody Wilson-Raybould): "In terms of the legislation, reasonable foreseeability and the elements
of eligibility in terms of being able to seek medical assistance in dying, all must be read together. We
purposefully provided flexibility to medical practitioners to use their expertise, to take into account all
of the circumstances of a person's medical condition and what they deem most appropriate or define
as reasonably foreseeable."
56. This is a principle of statutory interpretation (e.g. the Preamble is an "intrinsic aid"). See, e.g.,
Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016).
57. This point was signaled at one point in the debates in the House by Sean Casey, Parliamentary
Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, as he placed great weight on the
inclusion of the words "has become": "I would ask the member to read the two words in front of those
two words, which are 'has become.' Therefore, the reasonable foreseeability in the bill is only in the
context of a change in someone's conditions." See House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess,
Vol 148, No 60 (20 May 2016) at 1243 (Sean Casey).
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indicate that our natural death "has become" reasonably foreseeable. What
that something is, though, is not revealed by the phrase "has become."
Therefore, the inclusion of "has become" in the provision indicates that s.
241.2(2)(d) should not be interpreted as simply meaning that it is not far-
fetched to predict that a person will die a natural death (i.e., the ordinary
and legal meaning). What then should it be taken to mean?
The phrase "taking into account all of their medical circumstances,
without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific length
of time that they have remaining" may signal how we are supposed to
narrow the ordinary and legal meaning of "reasonably foreseeable" to
respond to the inclusion of "has become" in the provision.
According to the Oxford Concise Medical Dictionary, "prognosis"
means "an assessment of the future course and outcome of a patient's
disease, based on knowledge of the course of the disease in other patients
together with the general health, age, and sex of the patient."58
A logical implication of the wording in the provision is that the
following statements are consistent with the provision:
(1) it is not necessary for any prognosis to have been made as to a
specific length of time until death;
(2) it is not necessary for any prognosis to have been made; and
(3) it is necessary for a prognosis (not necessarily as to a specific
length of time) to have been made.
The first statement is obviously true. Statement 1 is not only consistent
with the provision, it is logically implied by it.
While logically consistent, one can argue that statement 2 makes no
sense. If the government had meant statement 2, surely they would have
said so directly (i.e., saying instead "without any prognosis necessarily
having been made"). Reading the provision as meaning that no prognosis
needs to have been made renders "as to the specific length of time that they
have remaining" mere surplusage. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude
that the implication of the wording of this provision is that some prognosis
is required, i.e. we should reject statement 2.
What, then, we must ask, is the meaning of "prognosis (not necessarily
as to a specific length of time)" in the third statement? There are two
possible interpretations of the implications of the additional phrase "not
necessarily as to a specific length of time." It could mean that a specific
or non-specific length of time is required, or that no length of time is
required.
58. Oxford Concise Medical Dictionary, 9th ed, sub verbo "prognosis" (emphasis added).
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The main problem with the first ("a specific or non-specific length
of time required") interpretation is that, in the context of prognoses, the
concept of a "non-specific length of time" is at best unclear and at worst
nonsensical. In clinical terms, survival predictions always involve both
a probability and a temporal range (e.g., 95 percent chance of death in
less than six months, 90 percent chance of death in two to five years, 10
percent chance of death from the condition within ten years). What could
make one range specific and another not specific? What would be a specific
range as opposed to a vague one?
On the other hand, the second ("no length of time required")
interpretation has its own large problem: why does the legislation include
the word "specific" if the provision was intended to completely remove
time (specific or non-specific) from the requirement for a prognosis? Why
not simply say "without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to
the length of time that they have remaining"? The "no length of time"
interpretation seems to render "specific" mere surplusage.
We could try to stop here and conclude that statement 3 above is
true: s. 241.2(2)(d) requires only that a medical or nurse practitioner
has concluded that it is not far-fetched to provide an assessment of
the future course of a patient's disease to natural death, based on
knowledge of the course of the disease in other patients together with the
general health, age, and sex of the patient (which could either include a
specific or non-specific length of time the patient has remaining, or not
include any prediction of the length of time remaining).
However, this leaves open which interpretation of statement 3 is true:
does the necessary prognosis require a prediction of a specific or non-
specific length of time the patient has remaining, or does the necessary
prognosis not require any prediction of the length of time remaining?
In addition, some might argue that "reasonably foreseeable" is
narrower than we have suggested, that is, they might argue for there being
additional requirements to be met. These people would argue that "has
become reasonably foreseeable" requires that the 90 percent chance of
natural death that we all face from birth has changed in some way, in
addition to it now being not far-fetched to provide a prognosis related to
natural death (not necessarily as to a specific length of time).
Again, we must look further for additional interpretive direction.
2. Section 241.2(2)
In the House and the Senate, the Government rightly indicated that
s. 241.2(2)(d) must be read in light of all of the eligibility criteria.
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In particular, reading the provision in light of the entire section means
that one can rule out certain potential features to meet the "has become"
element of s. 241.2(2)(d) if those features are already covered in s. 241.2
and s. 241.2(2)(a) through (c). That is, without (a) through (c), possible
interpretations of "has become reasonably foreseeable" could be that the
person has developed an incurable condition, is now in an advanced state
of irreversible decline in capability, or is now experiencing enduring and
intolerable suffering. However, these are already found as distinct criteria
in the section. Subsection (d) must therefore mean something in addition
to the characteristics covered in (a) through (c).59
Section 241.2(2)(d) must operate to divide the category of competent
adults making voluntary decisions (because of s. 241.2(1)) and who
have an incurable condition, are in an advanced state of decline, and
are experiencing enduring and intolerable suffering (ss. 241.2(2)(a)-
(c)) into two sub-categories-one of which will be eligible and one of
which will not. The dividing line could centre on one or more of the
following characteristics: early versus late stage fatal conditions; non-
fatal degenerative conditions with versus without other sufficiently life-
limiting medical circumstances; physical disability with versus without
other sufficiently life-limiting medical circumstances; and mental illness
with versus without other sufficiently life-limiting medical circumstances.
Looking at s. 241.2(2)(d) in context thus tells us that "has become
reasonably foreseeable" does not mean an incurable condition, in an
advanced state of irreversible decline in capability, or experiencing
enduring and intolerable suffering. However, it does not tell us what it
does mean. In other words, it does not help us to describe the critical
dividing line.
3. The preamble
It is tempting to turn to the preamble to the Act for insight into the meaning
of the expression "has become reasonably foreseeable":
Whereas, in light of the above considerations, permitting access to
medical assistance in dying for competent adults whose deaths are
59. It must be noted here that Justice Perell's decision might, at first glance, appear to fall into
the trap of suggesting this interpretation of the provision. He does link "reasonably foreseeable" to
the other eligibility criteria in s. 241.2(2). However, reading carefully, it can be seen that he uses
subsections (a) through (c) as the criteria for the trajectory toward death having shifted (presumably
from the 90 percent certainty we all experience to something else). It is logically possible to be on a
trajectory toward death for easons other than (a)-(c) and it is logically possible to have (a)-(c) and not
be on a trajectory toward death. Therefore, because Perell says atpara 83 "on a trajectory toward death
because he or she: [(a) through (c)]," Perell's statement is not the logical equivalent of "reasonably
foreseeable" being interpreted as simply a person having (a)-(c) (emphasis added).
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reasonably foreseeable strikes the most appropriate balance between the
autonomy of persons who seek medical assistance in dying, on one hand,
and the interests of vulnerable persons in need of protection and those of
society, on the other;6"
However, this text doesn't provide much direction. It exposes the purpose
of restricting access to MAiD to individuals whose death "has become
reasonably foreseeable," but it doesn't expose the meaning of "has become
reasonably foreseeable."
The "above considerations" referenced in the section of the preamble
quoted previously are the following:
Whereas robust safeguards, reflecting the irrevocable nature of ending a
life, are essential to prevent errors and abuse in the provision of medical
assistance in dying;
Whereas vulnerable persons must be protected from being induced, in
moments of weakness, to end their lives;
Whereas it is important to affirm the inherent and equal value of every
person's life and to avoid encouraging negative perceptions of the quality
of life of persons who are elderly, ill or disabled;
Whereas suicide is a significant public health issue that can have lasting
and harmful effects on individuals, families and communities;6'
The first two of these are at least in part dealt with in the consent
requirements (voluntariness) and the procedural safeguards (e.g., two
independent assessments and waiting period) elsewhere in the Act.62 The
last two, less so. Section 241.2(2)(d) seems primarily aimed at the last two
objectives in the preamble, but could also be aimed at addressing the first
two (if supplementing the other provisions in the Act).
Open questions remain, to which the Preamble provides no answers:
"what measures promote these objectives?" and "what definition 'strikes
the most appropriate balance' [between them and the other objectives of
the Act (most notably respect for autonomy)]?"
VI. Intermediate conclusions
We can draw three intermediate conclusions from the preceding analysis.
First, the legal meaning of natural death being "reasonably foreseeable"
implies "prediction of natural death is not far-fetched." Second, the
inclusion of the phrase "has become" adds that there must have been some
change in medical circumstances from being in a state of a 90 percent
60. Bill C-14, supra note 1, Preamble, para 6.
61. Ibid, Preamble, paras 2-5.
62. Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 241.2(3).
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chance of natural death to being in some other state in relation to one's
natural death. Third, the inclusion of the phrase "taking into account all of
their medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been
made as to the specific length of time that they have remaining" adds the
requirement of an assessment of the future course of a patient's disease
to natural death, based on knowledge of the course of the disease in other
patients together with the general health, age, and sex of the patient (either
with a requirement of a prediction of a non-specific or specific length of
time the patient has remaining, or without any prediction as to length of
time the patient has remaining) having been made.
However, we must proceed with further analysis for several reasons.
First, we must determine whether there are any arguments that overwhelm
the presumption that the phrase "reasonably foreseeable" should not
be taken to have its ordinary legal meaning as modified as required by
the text around it in s. 241.2(2)(d) (i.e., did the legislature signal that it
intended to deviate from this meaning beyond the deviations required by
"has become" and "taking into account all of their medical circumstances,
without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific length
of time that they have remaining"). Second, we must determine whether
there is anything else that can be drawn from legislative intent that shapes
the interpretation of s. 241.2(2)(d) and answers some of the open questions
identified earlier.
Given that there is ambiguity in the phrase "natural death has become
reasonably foreseeable," we must keep the ordinary and legal meanings,
and the insights from a close reading of the provision, the section, and the
Act in mind, but also look to legislative intent for additional interpretive
direction. We therefore turn now to a legislative intent analysis.
VII. Legislative intent
To assess legislative intent, we must look to statements made directly
on the point of the meaning of the legislation, statements made about
individuals or groups who would be eligible or not under the provision,
actions taken in response to attempts to amend the legislation, as well as
statements made about the purpose of the legislation. From each of these,
we can attempt to infer the intended meaning.
1. Statements about the meaning of the legislation
A review of all of the speeches in the House and Senate as well as testimony
before the House and Senate Committees, and background and other
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explanatory materials produced by the government reveal the legislative
intent behind s. 241.2(2)(d).63
Some conclusions can be confidently drawn about what s. 241.2(2)
(d) was not intended to mean. "Natural death has become reasonably
foreseeable":
* need not be caused by the grievous and irremediable condition64
* is not limited to fatal conditions65
* is not limited to being terminally ill 66
* is not limited to six months (U.S. model)6
* is not limited to "at the end of life" (Quebec model) 68
63. For transcripts of the above, see LegisInfo, "C-14," online: <www.parl.ca/Legislnfo/BillDetails.
aspx?Language-E&Mode-l&billld-8177165&View-0>. Senator George Baker foreshadowed that
the statutory interpretation process would rely on legislative intent: "A court in the future will look at
this bill and say, 'What does the bill mean as far as expectation of life is concerned?' They will go to
this background document and they will say, 'That's what this means in this bill.' Why? Because that's
what the Government of Canada says in their background document." (See Debates of the Senate,
(2 June 2016), supra note 37 at 1530 (George Baker).) Of course, a court would not restrict itself to
the background document. It should also be noted here that Anthony Housefather, Chair of House of
Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, said "what is also eminently reasonable
and strongly follows the will of the House of Commons is the minister rejecting the amendment to
remove the criteria of death being 'reasonably foreseeable."' He then went on to misdescribe the effect
of the Act as: limited to those "near the nd of his or her natural life," not including "people who have
purely psychological illness," "help people who are suffering intolerably but have an illness that will
extinguish their life at some future date," and claimed that the Act excluded "someone who comes
to them and who may have many years left to live, and who has an illness that we may find a cure
for in four or five years" (See House of Commons Debates, (16 June 2016), supra note 41 at 1329).
Housefather's statements were inconsistent with the statements made by Ministers Wilson-Raybould
and Philpott, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada Scan
Casey, and official government documents; see examples discussed in Part 5.1. We have therefore
disregarded his comments in our analysis.
64. E.g. Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Evidence, 42nd Parl, 1st
Sess, No 8 (4 May 2016) (Jody Wilson-Raybould): "However, in terms of the way that we've drafted
our definition around 'grievous and irremediable,' all of those elements need to be read together in the
totality of the circumstances."
65. E.g. House of Commons Debates (22 April 2016), supra note 55 at 1010 (Jody Wilson-
Raybould): "To be clear, the bill does not require that people be dying from a fatal illness or disease or
be terminally ill."
66. E.g. House of Commons Debates, 42nd Part, 1st Sess, Vol 148, No 46 (2 May 2016) at 1559
(Arif Virani): "Bill C-14 is actually more permissive than any assisted-dying legislation in North
America. In Quebec, an applicant must have a terminal disease. Bill C-14 is more accessible. It would
allow medical assistance in dying where death is reasonably foreseeable, looking at the totality of the
medical circumstances."
67. E.g. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 42nd
Part, 1st Sess, No 10 (2 May 2016) at 1607 (Jody Wilson-Raybould): "eligibility does not depend on
a person's having a given amount of time remaining, such as a certain number of weeks or months to
live, as in the United States."
68. E.g. Debates of the Senate (1 June 2016) supra note 28 at 1700 (Jane Philpott): "'end of life' is
very difficult to define. It is a term that is used in the Quebec legislation. There are jurisdictions that
put real parameters around it that say the end of life must be anticipated within six months or a certain
period of time. [...] The solution was to recognize that, while we could have used the term 'end of
life' [...], we preferred instead to define 'grievous and irremediable' and to say that a natural death was
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None of these statements are inconsistent with the ordinary or legal
meaning of the words used in s. 241.2(2)(d) and there is evidence that
the legislature intended these conclusions. They should all be rejected as
interpretations of "natural death has become reasonably foreseeable."
But how is "reasonable foreseeability" limited if it is narrower than
the intermediate conclusions provided earlier? A number of possibilities
arise.
a. Definition by health professionals
In explaining its choice of the phrase "reasonably foreseeable," the
government made it clear that that the use of "reasonably foreseeable"
was intended to achieve maximum flexibility specifically with respect to
the exercise of professional expertise. For example, Minister of Justice
Jody Wilson-Raybould said the phrase was chosen to provide "maximum
flexibility for medical assessment to health care providers, both in terms of
the circumstances that led a person to be on a trajectory toward death and in
terms of the time during which they can seek medically assisted death."69
She further explained, "we specifically did not put a time frame around
reasonable foreseeability, as they have in other jurisdictions but left it to
medical professionals to determine based on individual circumstances.""0
Minister of Health Jane Philpott affirmed: "the concept of reasonable
foreseeability is a concept that respects the professional judgment of a
health care provider.""1
It is not clear, however, whether that exercise was intended to be in
relation to the application of the definition or in the actual definition.
We purposefully provided flexibility to medical practitioners to use their
expertise, to take into account all of the circumstances of a person's
medical condition and what they deem most appropriate or define as
reasonably foreseeable.72
While it is entirely appropriate forthere to be flexibility to allow the exercise
of professional expertise with respect to whether eligibility criteria in the
legislation have been met, it would be inappropriate for the flexibility to
'reasonably foreseeable,' which is a term that is understood and accepted by doctors, as I said before."
It should also be noted here that the government ook the exact phrase from the Quebec legislation re:
"advanced state of irreversible decline in capability." If it had intended to adopt the substance of the
Quebec provision with respect o "end of life," it is reasonable to presume it would have done the same
thing with the provision "at the end of life" found in the Quebec legislation.
69. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, 42nd Part,
1st Sess, No 10 (2 May 2016) at 1607 (Jody Wilson-Raybould).
70. Ibidat 1653 (Jody Wilson-Raybould).
71. Ibid at 1706 (Jane Philpott).
72. House ofCommons Debates (22 April 2016), supra note 55 at 1028 (Jody Wilson-Raybould).
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allow individual health care providers to define terms in the legislation.
First, the definition of a term in a piece of legislation should surely never
be left to the very individual who is subject to criminal liability under
that legislation. Flexibility is certainly left to those who will administer
a legislative provision." Flexibility is left with respect to the application
of legislative provisions.14 However, we have found no cases in which the
individual subjects of the provision actually define the provision.
Second, professional judgement and clinical expertise relates to
whether a patient has met a set of criteria, not to defining the criteia-e.g.,
it relates to whether a person has less than five years to live but not to
whether MAiD should be limited to persons who have less than five
years to live. It relates to the identification of the particular trajectory a
patient will follow to natural death. It does not relate to the question of
whether a patient should only have access to MAiD if she is on a particular
kind of trajectory (e.g., fatal condition). The definition of the eligibility
criteria is a social judgement (for legislatures) while the assessment of
whether the criteria have been met is a clinical judgement (by health care
professionals).
It might be argued, in response, that medicine and nursing are self-
regulating professions and that the government has delegated considerable
responsibility and authority to the colleges to regulate health professionals.
Perhaps, it might be argued, the legislative intent was to leave the definition
of "reasonably foreseeable" to the colleges. However, this argument
should be rejected for several reasons. First, the delegation of authority
to colleges comes from provincial/territorial governments (under their
jurisdiction over the administration of health). The federal government
plays no part in that delegation. In order for the colleges to be a delegated
authority, the federal government would have to have delegated authority
with respect to an aspect of the Criminal Code to the provinces/territories,
which would then delegate that authority to the colleges. Clearly, that
has not happened. Second, physicians and nurse practitioners are both
permitted to provide and assess eligibility for MAiD under the federal
legislation. If the regulators are given the authority to define the meaning of
C.reasonably foreseeable," the medical and nursing regulators could adopt
different definitions, and so this interpretation could result in the actual
73. See, e.g., Oliveira v Ontario (Disability Support Program Director), 2008 ONCA 123, 290 DLR
(4th) 282.
74. See, e.g., Tranchemontagne v Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), 2006 SCC 14,
[2006] 1 SCR 513. Provincial statutes such as the Administrative Tribunals Act, SBC 2004, ch 45, s
43(1) grant tribunals the jurisdiction "to determine all questions of fact, law or discretion that arise in
any matter before it, including constitutional questions."
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definition of a Criminal Code provision being different for physicians and
nurse practitioners even within the same province/territory.5
It might be argued that medicine and nursing associations frequently
establish clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) and that the government
intended to delegate responsibility for defining "reasonably foreseeable" to
professional associations. However, this argument too should be rejected
for several reasons.
First, physicians from a wide range of specialties provide MAID.
Which professional association would be authoritative? For example, the
Canadian Society of Palliative Care Physicians, the Canadian Association
of Critical Care Physicians, orthe CanadianAssociation ofMAiDAssessors
and ProvidersV6 This interpretation could result in the definition of the
law itself being different for different specialties. Second, both physicians
and nurse practitioners are permitted to provide and assess eligibility for
MAiD under the federal legislation. If their professional associations draft
CPGs, this interpretation could result in the actual definition of a Criminal
Code provision being different for physicians and nurse practitioners even
within the same province/territory.
Finally, in response to both the colleges and associations arguments,
the language used when discussing flexibility for health care providers
suggests the speakers were referring to individual providers and not their
regulatory bodies. As quoted above, the Minister of Justice said, "maximum
flexibility for medical assessment to health care providers, both in terms
of the circumstances that led a person to be on a trajectory toward death
and in terms of the time during which they can seek medically assisted
death.""7 She earlier said, as quoted above, "We purposefully provided
flexibility to medical practitioners to use their expertise, to take into
account all of the circumstances of a person's medical condition and what
they deem most appropriate or define as reasonably foreseeable."" This
is reiterated by the Minister of Health, who said, "[h]owever, the concept
of reasonable foreseeability is a concept that respects the professional
judgment of a health care provider."9
75. Inconsistency in how the term may be interpreted has been flagged as a concernby CAMAP See,
e.g., Kelly Grant, "Group of Assisted-Death Providers Publish Clinical-Practice Guideline," supra
note 40.
76. CAMAP, "Clinical Interpretation," supra note 38.
77. House of Commons, Evidence (2 May 2016), supra note 69 at 1607 (Jody Wilson-Raybould)
(emphasis added).
78. House of Commons Debates (22 April 2016), supra note 55 at 1028 (Jody Wilson-Raybould)
(emphasis added).
79. House of Commons, Evidence (2 May 2016), supra note 69 at 1706 (Jane Philpott) (emphasis
added).
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The use of the singular ("a person," "a provider") and "individual
circumstances" indicates application in specific cases rather than
determination of a general rule (i.e., definition) by a group.
Despite some apparent legislative intent, this interpretation should
therefore be rejected.
That said, once the definition is clear, it should be left to health care
providers to determine, using their professional judgement, whether the
patient has met the criterion of s. 241.2(2)(d).
It is worth noting here that these conclusions were also drawn by
Justice Perell in AB v. Canada. In his decision, Justice Perell issued an
"interpretative declaration" indicating that it is for the courts to interpret
the legislation: "In my opinion, making this declaration of statutory
interpretation would be useful and fall with this court's jurisdiction
to interpret and declare the civil law and it would not interfere with
prosecutorial discretion by issuing declarations purporting to predetermine
criminal liability.""0 He also indicated that it is the responsibility of
physicians to determine whether the eligibility criteria have been met:
I agree with Ontario and Canada that Bill C-14's legislative history (and
its language) demonstrates Parliament's intention that the physicians and
nurse practitioners who have been asked to provide medical assistance
in dying are exclusively responsible for deciding whether the Code's
criteria are satisfied without any pre-authorization from the courts."
b. Excluded set
Comments by the Minister of Justice and others indicate that the legislative
intent was to exclude people like the following:
1"a soldier with post-traumatic stress disorder, a young person who
suffered a spinal cord injury in an accident, or a survivor whose
mind is haunted by memories of sexual abuse'
8"2
80. AB, supra note 10 at para 66.
81. Ibidatpara62.
82. House of Commons Debates, 42nd Par, 1st Sess, Vol 148, No 62 (31 May 2016) at 1014 (Jody
Wilson-Raybould). The minister previously stated "a person with a major physical disability who
is otherwise in good health, or a person who solely suffers from mental illness, in the absence of
additional medical circumstances, may not be associated with a reasonably foreseeable death." (See
House of Commons Debates, (22 April 2016), supra note 55 at 1010 (Jody Wilson-Raybould).) But
does this mean that hese conditions may be associated with a reasonably foreseeable death? Or that
they cannot? Does "may not" refer to possibility or permissibility? "May not" has rarely been the
subject of statutory interpretation, but the Alberta Municipal Government Board has deliberated on
its meaning twice. In one case, "may not" was determined to mean "shall not" (see Re, Irwin (9
September 2004), MGB 090/04, online: MGB <www.municipalaffairs.alberta.ca/cfml/boardorders/
pdf/MGB%/ 20090-04.pdf>), while in the other case, "may not" was determined to confer discretion
(see Wnchell v Clearwater County (Subdivision Authority), 2015 ABMGB 2, online: MGB <www.
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"someone who is exclusively suffering from a physical or mental
disability, but who is otherwise in good health and whose natural
death is still many years away"8 ;
* "persons who have recently become disabled in a car accident and
have become quadriplegics"84 ;
"someone who recently became a paraplegic, whose mental
process, whose acceptance of their new circumstances, may be
very different if they waited a year"85;
* "For people who are suffering from schizophrenia, depression,
anxiety, et cetera, natural death is not a reasonable [sic] foreseeable
outcome ";
* "The matter of reasonable foreseeability of death would exclude
people suffering from mental illness alone [if not a kind of mental
illness that can cause death, e.g., anorexia]."
87
One could draw from such statements the intention to exclude individuals
with physical disability or mental disability or illness who are "otherwise
in good health." This could be because their natural death is in the too
distant future and/or because it is not possible to predict how the patient
will die a natural death, based on knowledge of the course of the disease in
other patients together with the general health, age, and sex of the patient
(not necessarily including any prediction of the specific length of time the
patient has remaining). In other words, that it is not reasonable to predict
how or when the person will die a natural death.
We turn therefore to the further consideration of the possible limits
within the definition of "reasonably foreseeable" as, arguably, they should
not lead to the inclusion of any of those who fall within this excluded set.
municipalaffairs.alberta.ca'cfml/boardorders/pdf/MGB /o20002-15.pdf>).
83. House of Commons Debates, 42nd Par, 1st Sess, Vol 148, No 47 (3 May 2016) at 1042 (Vance
Badawey).
84. House of Commons Debates (16 June 2016), supra note 41 at 1102 (Jody Wilson-Raybould).
85. Ibidat 1101 (Anthony Housefather).
86. Senate, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Evidence, 42nd Par, 1st Sess,
No 8 (4 May 2016) (Jane Philpott).
87. The legitimacy of the addition of the text in the square bracket is made evident through a letter
from the Attorney General of Canada to Jocelyn Downie; see Addendum in Jocelyn Downie & Justine
Dembo, "Medical Assistance in Dying and Mental Illness under the New Canadian Law," (2016)
(open volume) JEMH at 10, online: <www.jemlca/issues/v9/documents/JEMH Open-Volume
Benchmark Medical Assistance in Dying and Mental Illness Under the New Canadian Law-
Nov20l6.pdf>.
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c. Temporal proximity
It is thought by many that "reasonably foreseeable" means temporal
proximity, that is, it can be predicted that a person's natural death will
happen within a window of time.
The Minister of Justice stated "we specifically did not put a time
frame around reasonable foreseeability, as they have in other jurisdictions
[...] but left it to medical professionals to determine based on individual
circumstances.""8 This could be read as suggesting either a) there is no
temporal proximity requirement (with medical professionals determining
eligibility based on something other than temporal proximity) or b) there is
a temporal proximity requirement (with medical professionals determining
eligibility based on a temporal proximity standard determined by them).
The Minister of Health said "We could have said nothing about
the proximity of death. We could have specified a specific amount of
time-six months or 12 months. However, the concept of reasonable
foreseeability is a concept that respects the professional judgment of a
health care provider."9 This could be read as suggesting that it is up to
health care providers to determine whether natural death is sufficiently
proximate-with no parameters provided by the legislation (i.e., the
setting of the parameters is left to health care providers (this interpretation
being vulnerable to the arguments made above against the "definition by
health professionals" interpretation)).
Official explanations of "reasonably foreseeable" also included
reference to natural death being "not too remote ,".9 "within a period of
time that is not too remote from circumstances that can be predicted within
a range of reasonable possibilities,"91 and in the "not too distant future."
9 2
These phrases suggest an intention to require some temporal proximity.
In addition, the existence of a temporal proximity requirement might
be inferred from the fact that, as will be discussed in detail below, various
statements were made with respect to what the temporal proximity limit
might be.
All of this goes to support one of the two positions re: the meaning
of the prognosis clause in the text of s. 241.2(2)(d) discussed earlier. It
is evidence that "taking into account all of their medical circumstances,
without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific length
88. House of Commons, Evidence (2 May 2016), supra note 69 at 1653 (Jody Wilson-Raybould).
89. Ibid at 1706 (Jane Philpott).
90. E.g. Department of Justice, Legislative Background, supra note 42 at 20.
91. House ofCommons Debates (2 May 2016), supra note 66 at 1643 (Sean Casey).
92. Government of Canada, Department of Justice, "Glossary" (2016), online: <www.justice.gc.ca/
eng/cj-jp/ad-am/glos.html>.
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of time that they have remaining" implies "it is necessary for a prognosis
(including a non-specific or specific length of time) to have been made."
If it is decided that the legislative intent was to include a temporal
proximity requirement, the next question that we would have to address
is "what is the minimum length of time required in order to meet the
eligibility criterion?"
In a speech during the Senate debates on C-14, Senator Murray Sinclair
(a former judge) raised and relied upon the legal meaning of "reasonably
foreseeable" in a civil law context and stated that: "I want to point out
that reasonable foreseeability does not mean 'imminent.' It does not mean
someone has to be dying within the next short period of time. Death can
be far down the road.93
Indirect statements also indicate legislative intent regarding the length
(or window) of time that would meet the temporal proximity requirement.
For example, the Minister of Health stated that individuals would meet the
reasonably foreseeable criterion from the moment of a diagnosis of ALS
being made:
An example of a case [that would be in] would be the matter of
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. [...] From the time that that diagnosis
is made, sadly, a person's death is reasonably foreseeable. [...] On the
matter of whether or not their death is reasonably foreseeable on a
diagnosis ofALS, I think few doctors would disagree that it is reasonably
foreseeable, because it usually happens within a matter of months or
years. (emphasis added)94
This seems to set the minimum limit for "not too remote" at "usually
within a matter of months or years." It is, of course, impossible to tell from
this how many years the minimum predicted survival is to be classified as
"too remote." Statistics from the ALS society show some of the problems
with this example:
Most people who develop ALS are between the ages of 40 and 70, with
an average age of 55 at the time of diagnosis. However, cases of the
disease do occur in persons in their twenties and thirties. [...] Half of all
people affected with ALS live at least three or more years after diagnosis.
Twenty percent live five years or more; up to ten percent will live more
than ten years.95
93. Debates of the Senate (17 June 2016), supra note 9 at 1210 (Murray Sinclair).
94. Debates of the Senate (1 June 2016), supra note 28 at 1700 (Jane Philpott).
95.ALS Association, "Who GetsALS?," online: <webma.alsa.org/site/PageServer/?pagename-MA 1
WhoGets.html>.
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The average life-expectancy at diagnosis of ALS is two to five years;
Stephen Hawking was diagnosed at 21 and died in 2018 at 76.
What temporal limit can one draw from these statistics for the
minimum? Is it two or five years? Or three?
Also, while the Minister of Health said that someone at the time of
a diagnosis of ALS meets the criterion, what about other conditions? In
other words, does ALS represent a maximum survival time to qualify?
Or does it simply fall under the maximum with that not being set by the
survival time of persons at the time of diagnosis with ALS?
Further, does this expression of sufficient proximity in terms of two
to five years or three years not violate the text of the provision itself by
requiring a prognosis having been made as to the specific length of time?
Is real specificity re: the maximum qualifying time (i.e., that it is not
exceeded) required to meet this test? This problem cannot be addressed
by reverting to the non-specific expression "months or years" as that
expression is hopelessly (and arguably impermissibly in light of Charter
values) vague.
The Minister of Justice also addressed the issue of reasonable
foreseeability in relation to a specific circumstance (this time a specific
person rather than diagnosis). She stated: "I am 100 per cent confident hat
Kay Carter would be eligible under Bill C-14 to access medical assistance
in dying. 96 Understanding Kay Carter's circumstances may therefore
provide insight into the intended meaning of "reasonably foreseeable."
Kay Carter was not terminally ill and, indeed, had a life-expectancy
of considerably more than six or 12 months. The life expectancy of an
89-year-old woman in British Columbia in 2009-2011 was six years.
97
Spinal stenosis itself does not significantly shorten life expectancy.98 Based
on the information available to the Minister (i.e., introduced into evidence
in Carter v. Canada99), the Minister's comments are inconsistent with a
temporal proximity window of anything less than six years. Again, though,
we don't know whether this set of medical circumstances ets the ceiling
or simply falls somewhere under the ceiling. "Reasonable foreseeability"
96. Debates of the Senate (1 June 2016), supra note 28 at 1420 (Jody Wilson-Raybould).
97. According to Statistics Canada, the life expectancy is 5.88 years for an 89-year-old woman in
British Columbia: Statistics Canada, "Table 1lb: Complete life table, females, British Columbia, 2009
to 2011" (2015), online: <wwwl50.statcan.gc.ca/nl/pub/84-537-x/2013005/tbl/tblllb-eng.htm>.
98. Spinal stenosis might be estimated to likely reduce her life expectancy by approximately 0.6
years. BB Hatch et al, "Factors predictive of survival and estimated years of life lost in the decade
following nontraumatic and traumatic spinal cord injury" (2017) 55:6 Spinal Cord 540.
99. Carter v Canada, 2012 BCSC 1587, 104 WCB (2d) 447 (Evidence, Affidavit of Lee Carter,
24 August 2011, online: <bccla.org/wp-contentl/uploads/2012/06/20110824-Affidavit-Lee-Carter-
Affidavit.pdf >).
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could be interpreted as "six years is the outside boundary for eligibility" or
"six years is less than the outside boundary for eligibility."
Thus it might be argued that the legislative intent was to have
"reasonably foreseeable" establish a requirement for temporal proximity
(with an outside limit of "not too remote," two to five years, six years, or
as determined by health care providers100).
However, this interpretation faces numerous challenges. First, "not
too remote" alone is arguably impermissible vague-how remote is too
remote? If rendered less vague by attribution of a temporal window (e.g.,
less than five years), it may violate the prohibition on requiring a prognosis
with a specific length of time. While there is a window (so it might be
tempting to say the required length of time is not specific), in order to
make a determination of whether the individual qualifies, the health care
provider will have to make a determination of whether the individual has
a prognosis of the specific number that represents the lower limit of the
window, that is, a specific length of time. However, in response, one might
argue that this is not specific as it is a range, e.g., "five to six" and the
provider need not make a prognosis of five years. Also in response, one
might argue that the further the probability falls away from a 100 percent
chance of death within each particular timeframe, the less specific the
prognosis is regarding the length of time the patient has remaining.
In the final analysis, there are three reasons to conclude that the
legislative intent was not to include a temporal proximity requirement.
First, there are statements that suggest a rejection of a temporal proximity
limit. Second, some statements explicitly referenced the established legal
meaning of "reasonably foreseeable"-which is non-temporal-when
explaining the meaning of the statute.1 Third, this is the conclusion drawn
in the only court decision we have on the issue.1"2
On the other hand, there are two reasons to conclude that the legislative
intent was to include a temporal proximity requirement. First, there are
statements that suggest a temporal interpretation. Second, it appears that
some of the actors appear to have believed, incorrectly, that the established
legal meaning of "reasonably foreseeable" was temporal.
100. Assuming the arguments made above against leaving the definition (as opposed to application of
the definition) to health care providers are rejected.
101. See, e.g., Debates of the Senate (2 June 2016), supra note 37 at 1500 (Serge Joyal): " 'Reasonably
foreseeable' is a Criminal Code concept based essentially on predictability. Predictability means
something will happen, not proximity of time. Reasonably foreseeable is predictability, not proximity
of time or deatl"
102. AB, supra note 10.
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It can also be concluded that, if temporal proximity was intended to
be a limit, there are very strong arguments in support of the interpretation
that the temporal proximity window is no less than five years based on
statements from the Minister of Justice's statements regarding whether
or not Kay Carter qualified"3 and statements from the Minister of Health
regarding qualification from the moment of diagnosis of ALS.°4 But there
is no clear answer available to the question how many more years can
be added before long is too long, distant is too distant, and remote is too
remote?
d. Prognosis (other than as to length of time)
Turning back to the suggestion made earlier that s. 241.2(2)(d) requires
only that it is not far-fetched to provide an assessment of the future course
of a patient's disease to natural death, based on knowledge of the course
of the disease in other patients together with the general health, age, and
sex of the patient (not necessarily requiring any prediction of the length
of time the patient has remaining), how well (or not) does this square with
legislative intent?
The government offered an additional range of phrases when discussing
reasonably foreseeable" including "on a path toward death,.1.5 "on a
trajectory toward death,"10 6 and "on a trajectory toward the end of their
lives."1 7 These seem to resonate with this interpretation of s. 241.2(2)(d).
They do not import any requirement of temporal proximity (whether non-
specific or specific).
The challenge this interpretation faces comes from the fact that, as
described above, there is some evidence that it was the legislative intent to
have a temporal proximity requirement for eligibility and this interpretation
does not require temporal proximity. Also, as was also noted earlier, it
could be argued that not requiring a length of time (as this doesn't) renders
the term "specific" in the provision mere surplusage.
2. Statements about the purpose of the legislation
We might try to infer meaning for s. 241.2(2)(d) from statements made
by the government about the purpose of the legislation. Specifically, the
Preamble states the "reasonably foreseeable" provision was designed to
103. Debates of the Senate (1 June 2016), supra note 28 at 1420 (Jody Wilson-Raybould).
104. Ibid at 1700 (Jane Philpott).
105. E.g. House ofCommons Debates (2 May 2016), supra note 66 at 1643 (Sean Casey).
106. E.g. House ofCommons Debates (31 May 2016), supra note 82 at 1014 (Jody Wilson-Raybould).
107. E.g. House ofCommons Debates (2 May 2016), supra note 66 at 1643 (Sean Casey).
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protect vulnerable persons. The Minister of Justice spoke frequently about
the objective of protecting the vulnerable.08
It is possible that they were concerned about people being vulnerable
to coercion. However, this cannot provide meaning for s. 241.2(2)(d)
because that concern is already dealt with through the specific requirement
of voluntary consent:
s. 241.2(1)(d) they have made a voluntary request for medical assistance
in dying that, in particular, was not made as a result of external pressure;
It is possible that they were concerned about people lacking decision-
making capacity (whether temporarily or consistently). However, this
cannot provide meaning for s. 241.2(2)(d) because that concern is already
dealt with through the specific requirement of capacity:
s. 241.2(1)(b) they are at least 18 years of age and capable of making
decisions with respect to their health;
To read vulnerability re: voluntariness or capacity into "reasonably
foreseeable" would render these provisions or s. 241.2(2)(d) redundant
and the new interpretation would violate the rule against mere surplusage.
The Ministers expressed concerns about the excluded set described
above at various points during Bill C-14's passage (see section 1.6.1.2).
If protecting all of the people in the excluded set requires excluding them
from access to MAID, then the most restrictive interpretation would be the
intermediate conclusion with no requirement of a predicted length of time
as none of these individuals have a condition for which one can offer a
prediction of the future trajectory to natural death and, as soon as they have
such circumstances, they fall outside the parameters of the set. Temporal
108. See, e.g., Debates of the Senate (1 June 2016), supra note 28 at 1430 (Jody Wilson-Raybould:
"we sought to find the right balance in terms of the objectives of this bill and balancing and respecting
personal autonomy, while recognizing that we need to do as much as we can to protect the vulnerable
among us"; House of Commons Debates, (31 May 2016), supra note 82 at 1014 (Jody Wilson-
Raybould): "it would limit medical assistance in dying to persons in these types of circumstances in
order to prevent the normalization of suicide, protect vulnerable persons who were disproportionately
at risk of inducement to suicide, and affirm the equal value of every person's life"; House of Commons
Debates (3 May 2016) supra note 83 at 1042 (Vance Badawey): "However, medical assistance in
dying is not a solution to all forms of medical suffering. Such an approach would raise unacceptable
risks, particularly for vulnerable people throughout our society. Take the example of someone who
is exclusively suffering from a physical or mental disability, but who is otherwise in good health
and whose natural death is still many years away. Making medical assistance in dying available to
people in these circumstances risks reinforcing negative stereotypes of the lives lived by Canadians
with disabilities, and could suggest that death is an acceptable alternative to any level of medical
suffering or disability. This risks undermining our efforts to combat suicide, a pressing public health
problem that affects not only those who die by suicide, but also their families, friends, and overall
communities."
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proximity would allow access for the individuals in the set whose natural
death is sufficiently close in time.
3. Actions taken during the legislative process
We might try to infer meaning for s. 241.2(2)(d) from actions taken by the
legislature with respect to amendments suggested in Committee(s) and
in the House and Senate. The majority of the House rejected proposed
amendments (at the House Justice Committee hearings, by the Senate as
a whole, and in the House debates) that would have removed s. 241.2(2).
Had the amendments suggested revised wording for s. 241.2(2)(d), then
it might be possible to infer meaning from the rejections by reasoning
that one could at least be clear what the provision doesn't mean, i.e., the
rejected amendment. However, the proposed amendments were to delete
all of s. 241.2(2), most especially s. 241.2(2)(d), so all one can infer is that
the government wanted the provision to remain. No inferences regarding
meaning can be drawn.
Conclusion
No interpretation of s. 241.2(2)(d) can be shown to be consistent with
all of the rules of statutory interpretation and all of the expressions of
legislative intent. Three interpretations might be considered viable after
reviewing the preceding lengthy analysis:
1. "In the professional opinion of the health care provider, it is not far-
fetched to forecast survival of something less than five years given
the totality of the person's medical circumstances (including age and
frailty) ."109
2. "In the professional opinion of the health care provider, it is not far-
fetched to forecast an assessment of the future course of a patient's
medical circumstances (including age and frailty) to natural death,
based on knowledge of the course of such medical circumstances in
other patients together with the general health, age, and sex of the
109. It is important to note here that the government repeatedly indicated that the entirety of a
person's medical circumstances (including age and frailty) should be taken into account in assessing
"reasonable foreseeability." We have therefore modified the interpretation grounded in the dictionary
definition of prognosis as follows: change "disease" to "medical circumstances (including age and
frailty)." In addition, the government's phrases "on a path to death" and "on a trajectory" are, in
effect, no more limited than the ordinary and legal meaning of "reasonably foreseeable" (and thus do
not meet the "has become" limit discussed earlier), so they need to be narrowed. "Future course of a
patient's medical circumstances" can provide the necessary feature for "has become." A person has to
have undergone a change in circumstances to move from the 90 percent chance of natural death that
we all have from birth to a reasonably assessable course of medical circumstances to natural death.
Therefore, requiring that a person have a reasonably assessable course of medical circumstances to
natural death meets the "has become" requirement.
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patient (necessarily including a prediction of the specific or non-
specific length of time the patient has remaining)."
3. "In the professional opinion of the health care provider, it is not far-
fetched to forecast an assessment of the future course of a patient's
medical circumstances (including age and frailty) to natural death,
based on knowledge of the course of such medical circumstances in
other patients together with the general health, age, and sex of the
patient (not necessarily including any prediction of the length of
time the patient has remaining)."
What remains constant between these three is:
* "In the professional opinion of the health care provider, it is not
far-fetched to forecast"; and
* "given the totality of the person's medical circumstances (including
age and frailty)."
What varies is what needs to be forecast:
* survival of something less than five years; or
* the future course of a patient's medical circumstances to natural
death and within that, whether
o necessarily including a requirement of a prediction of a
specific or non-specific length of time; or
o not requiring any prediction of any length of time.
While the three interpretations set out above might be considered
viable, we believe that the second and third are more defensible than
the first. They are consistent with the "without a prognosis necessarily
having been made been made as to the specific length of time that they
have remaining" clause. They deviate less than the temporal proximity
interpretation because they require less narrowing of the ordinary and
legal meaning. Both interpretations add a requirement of a prognosis
having been made, but the temporal proximity interpretation requires the
additional narrowing of a necessary rather than merely sufficient element
of temporal proximity. It is therefore one step further away from the
ordinary and legal meaning.
As between the second and third, we believe that the third is the most
defensible. It is the most consistent with the rules and traditions of statutory
interpretation (including the ordinary and legal meaning of "reasonably
foreseeable," basic logic, the language in the Act itself, and legislative
intent, especially the excluded sets). And it is consistent with the only
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court decision we have on the issue, which rejected a temporal proximity
necessary condition.110
We would argue that medical and nurse practitioners assessing
eligibility for MAiD should therefore ask themselves whether it is far-
fetched to forecast an assessment of the future course of a patient's medical
circumstances (including age and frailty) to natural death, based on
knowledge of the course of such medical circumstances in other patients
together with the general health, age, and sex of the patient (not necessarily
including any prediction of the length of time the patient has remaining).
If it is not far-fetched, they should consider the eligibility criterion in s.
241.2(2) to have been met.
It should be legally safe to operate under this interpretation-it is at
least a plausible interpretation, and where there is more than one plausible
interpretation of an ambiguous Criminal Code provision, any court should
apply strict construction and accept the interpretation most favourable to
the accused for the purposes of responding to charges in a particular case."
It is critically important for health care providers to know that this rule of
statutory interpretation (i.e. strict construction) should protect them in the
interim until we have an authoritative judicial determination of the meaning
of the provision. Until a higher court provides a different interpretation than
Justice Perell or until there is an amendment of s. 241.2(2)(d) to provide
a definition of "their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable,
taking into account all of their medical circumstances, without a prognosis
necessarily having been made as to the specific length of time that they
have remaining," or the ambiguity re: the meaning of the provision is
otherwise resolved, this interpretation should be able to be safely adopted.
110. AB, supra note 10 at paras 79-83.
111. See R v DLW, supra note 43; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2
SCR 559; R v Hasselwander, [1993] 2 SCR 398. See also UnitedNurses ofAlberta vAlberta (Attorney
General), [1992] 1 SCR 901 at paras 59-60: "'In summary, I have concluded that on the basis of the
ordinary rules of construction, s. 142(7) does not authorize the imposition of punishment for criminal
contempt. At minimum, the equivocal or ambiguous nature of the words "enforceable as a judgment"
leave a reasonable doubt with respect to this issue. The appellant is entitled to the benefit of this doubt.
InMaxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th ed. 1969), at 246, this rule of construction is expressed
or follows:
The effect of the rule of strict construction might be summed up by saying that, where an
equivocal word or ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable doubt of its meaning which the
canons of interpretation fail to solve, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the subject and
against the legislature which has failed to explain itself. If there is no ambiguity, and the act or
omission in question falls clearly within the mischief of the statute, the construction of a penal
statute differs little, if at all, from that of any other.
This is a rule that is applied by this Court and was applied recently inR. v. Green, 1992 CanLII 128
(SCC), [1992] 1 SCR 614, to resolve an ambiguity in the interpretation of s. 254 of the Criminal Code,
R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46."
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We would also argue that all entities with the relevant authority and
responsibility to provide guidance to medical and nurse practitioners
should exercise their authority and capacity to provide interpretive
guidance for, and education about, the practice of MAiD in Canada by
adopting, endorsing, and disseminating this interpretation. Doing so will
increase harmonization across the country with respect o access to MAiD
and help us to realize the goal that access to MAiD does not vary because
the legislation itself is being interpreted differently by different providers
and their advisors. Doing this will also reduce the chill created by the
uncertainty about the meaning of the "reasonably foreseeable" criterion in
C-14 and enhance nd of life care for Canadians (as amply illustrated by
the prevarication by the physician in AB v. Canada).
Finally, we would argue that now that the reasonably foreseeable
confusion over the meaning of s. 241.2(2)(d) is evident in practice,
112
the Government should not leave health care providers vulnerable to an
uncertain threat of criminal penalty and should not leave the onerous (and
often insurmountable) burden of clarifying the legislation through the
courts on the backs of patients and providers, but rather should amend the
Criminal Code to make its meaning clear.
A verypractical coda
Before closing, we offer a restatement of the interpretation argued for in
this paper. Testing the interpretation with medical and nurse practitioners,
we found that it was not expressed in language that was accessible to them.
We therefore "translated" the interpretation drawn from the exercise of
strict statutory interpretation to a statement hat retains the meaning but is
more accessible:
"Natural death has become reasonably foreseeable" does not mean that
eligibility is limited to fatal conditions, being terminally ill, predicted
survival of six or twelve months, or being "at the end of life" or "nearing
the end of life." There is no temporal proximity limit on eligibility for
access to MAiD in Canada. Temporal proximity can be sufficient for
concluding natural death is reasonably foreseeable but it is not necessary.
It is not necessary to predict the length of time the patient has remaining.
"Natural death has become reasonably foreseeable" means that, in the
professional opinion of the medical or nurse practitioner, taking into
account all of the patient's medical circumstances, how or when the
patient's natural death will occur is reasonably predictable.
112. See Meaghan Craig, "Medically Assisted Death Fails Saskatoon Family," Keith Gerein, "'An
Iron Will"'; Kas Roussy, "Parkinson's Patient Forced to Battle Bureaucracy," supra note 13.
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We also offer some concrete illustrations of the implications of the
interpretation, i.e., examples of individuals who would be eligible/
ineligible if this interpretation were adopted:
Eligible (if s. 241.2(2)(a) through (c) met)
Patient with Amyotrohic Lateral Sclerosis, Parkinson's, Huntington,
Spinal Muscular Atrophy, or Alzheimer's
Patient with intractable anorexia
Patient with locked-in syndrome who refuses artificial hydration and
nutrition
Ineligible (even if s. 241.2(2) (a) through (c) met)
40-year-old patient with incurable cancer for which suffering can be
controlled by means acceptable to the patient
25-year-old patient with paraplegia resulting from a car accident but no
other health conditions
60-year-old patient with spinal stenosis but no other health conditions
45-year-old patient with chronic pain but no other health conditions
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